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COMMENTS ON RECENT DECISIONS
P. 265 (in which the principal contest was on other items of evidence).
A similar conclusion is reached in Beckett v. Northwestern Masonic
Aid Association, 67 Minn. 298, 69 N. W. 923, a civil case, in which
the substances of which the targets were composed was not clearly
stated, and in State v,. Asbell, supra, in which the targets themselves
were not introduced, but the testimony of witnesses as to the results
of the experiment was given. In all these cases differences in the sub-
stances used as targets and the flesh actually shot were considered as
going to the credibility, not the competency, of the evidence, and in
Irby %,. State, supra, and in Rodgers v. State, 93 Tex. Cr. R. 1,245 S.W.
697, decided in 1921 and 1922, respectively, it was expressly held that
to make experimental testimony admissible it is not necessary that the
experiment be made under exactly similar circumstances to those of
the case. F.W.F.
REAL PROPERTY.
Farmers' Bank of Hickory v. Bradley. Kansas City Court of Appeals,
1925, 271 S. W. 857.
MORTGAGES-CONSTRUCTIVE SEVERANCE - GROW-
ING CORN. Action in replevin to recover growing corn, and dam-
ages for its detention. One Bassfield owed the plaintiff a large sum
of money, and gave the plaintiff his note secured by a chattel mortgage
on a field of growing corn. The corn stood on land owned by Bassfield,
but subject to a deed of trust in favor of the Central Mortgage Cum-
pany. The deed of trust was executed more than a year before the
chattel mortgage. Subsequently, the land was sold under the deed of
trust to the defendant, who took possession of the land anld corn, and
held the same until this action was filed. The plaintiff, as holder of the
chattel mortgage, contends that until foreclosure the title and owner-
ship of the land were in Bassfield. that the execution of the chattel
mortgage was a constructive severance of the ctop from the realty, and
therefore the crop did not pass to the purchaser of the land under
foreclosure. The court, agreeing with the contentions of the defend-
ant. admitted that there could be constructive severance of a growing
crop as between vendor and vendee, and held that the deed of trust
on the land covered the crops thereon until severed, and there could
be no constructive severance of the corn by the execution of a chattel
mortgage as against the deed of trust on the realty.
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As the decision above was contrary to the ruling of the Spring-
field Court of Appeals in the Farmers Bank of Mt. Vernon v. Parker,
215 Mo. 96, 245 S. W. 586, the case was transferred to the Supreme
Court of Missouri, and is in that court at the present time. The facts
in the Parker case were similar to the fact in the Bradley case above.
The contention was over the right to growing wheat as between the
holder of the chattel mortgage and the holder of the deed of trust. The
court held, that the execution of the chattel mortgage on the growing
wheat was a constructive severance of the wheat from the realty, mak-
ing the wheat personalty, and as such belonged to the holder of the
chattel mortgage. As authority for the decision, the court cited Witlus
v. Moore, 59 Texas 628; 46 Am. St. Rep. 284, White v. Pulley, 27
Fed 436, and a clause from Jones on "Chattel Mort.ages," but in
addition they recognized Jones v. Adams, 370 re. 473; 59 Pac. 811;
50 L. R. A. 388, as authority to the contrary. The statement from
Jones (5th Ed). sec. 130, page 188: "Growing crops are so far a part
of the realty that upon entry of a mortagee of the land, all the crops
not severed pass under the mortgage. But a chattel morte-age of crops.
made by the owner in possession, onerates in law as a severance of
them, so that they will not pass under the mortgage of the land upon
the subsequent entry of the mortLavee and the sale of the realty under
the morte-aoe." In Willus v. Moore, supfira, the court. basing its de-
cision on the Texas rule that a mortgage is a mere security for a debt,
that the paramount title is in the mortgagor, and that no estate passes
to the ='or't-agee till foreclosure, decided that by executing the chattel
rh6btgaze the mortgagor constructively severed the crop from the
realty as against the mortgagee. In White v. Pulley, supra, the court,
citing Wiltis v. Moore as authority, said, "A mortgagor is entitled to
sever, in law or in fact, the crops which stand on his land any time
prior to the destruction of his title by sale or entry under the mort-
gage," and decided that a chattel mortgae was such a constructive
severance of the crops from the realty that the crop did not pass to
the morte-agee tinder execution. However, the weight of authority
seems to be contrary to the decision in the Parker case, supra, and in
accord with the Bradley case, supra, and Jones v,. Adams, supra, where
the courts were opposed to the idea of constructive severance of the
crop from the realty by the execution of a chattel mortgage on the
crop. In Jones v. Adams, references supra, the court said, "Unless
there is an actual severance, the crops pass with the title to the soil to
which they are attached against the mortgagor, and a previous sale
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or mortgage by him will not constitute a severance as against a pur-
chaser at a foreclosure sale. The test is whether there is actual sever-
ance." There are many other cases which are opposed to the idea of
constructive severance. In Beckman vs. Sikes, 35 Ka. 120, it was held
that the lien of the mortgagee and the decree of foreclosure attached
to growing crops as well as to the land, and that the purchaser of the
land under the decree was entitled to growing crops as against the
vendee of the mortgagee. In Fruit Company v. Sherman Worrel Fruit
Co., 142 Cal. 643; 76 Pac. 484, the court decided that a chattel mort-
gage cannot operate against a purchaser of a trust deed as a severance
of the growing crop from the land. In Riely v. Carter, 75 Miss. 798;
23 S. W. 435, the court said in their opinion that the lien of the mort-
gagee attached to the growing crop until severed, as well as to the
land. In a leading New York case, it is said that a prior mortgage
takes precedence over a sale of the crop and thus takes precedence over
the vendee's rights by purchase of the crop under execution levied on
the crop, Shephard v. Philbrick, 2 Den. 174. The decision of the Su-
preme Court of Missouri when the Bradley case, supra, comes before
it is a matter of conjecture. Should they decide as the Kansas City
Court of Appeals did in saying that the execution of the chattel mort-
gage alone without any actual severance will not constitute such con-
structive severance as to entitle the holder of the chattel mortgage
to the crop, they would seem to be supported by the weight of
authority, but there is authority to the contrary. M. L. S.
Hardin v. Wolf et al., 148 N. E. 868. Supreme Court of Illinois, 1925.
JOINT TENANCY-DEED OF TRUST-SEVERANCE. A
bill in equity for partition by Mark Hardin against Mary J. Wolff and
others, in which William O'Brien intervened. Mark Hardin owned a
lot improved by a brick building in the city of Chicago. The property
was subject to two liens, one in favor of Mary J. Wolff, and the other
in favor of a third party. Hardin conveyed the property to Mary J.
Wolf, his daughter, who conveyed the property to a law clerk, who
reconveyed the property to Mark Hardin and Mary J. Wolf to take
and hold as joint tenants with a provision that on the death of one the
survivor was to take all the residue of the property. It was the inten-
tion of the parties that the daughter was to take care of the father until
his death, and that as payment she was to become owner of the prop-
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